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ABSTRACT 
 
In De rege et regis institutione libre tres (1599), the Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) offers 
a comprehensive analysis of European monarchical government. Mariana examines and refutes 
contemporary ideas of monarchical absolutism together with the legalistic cultures from which 
they arose. Mariana weighs doctrines from scholastic natural law theory and Roman law 
against historical experience and conceives a language of political prudence or Catholic reason 
of state that puts the pursuit of political consensus over conflict and the unrestrained exercise 
of royal power. De rege offers a political understanding that respects the plurality of political 
cultures within the Spanish Habsburg monarchy and a political language that reflects the reality 
of governing an early modern poly–centric body politic.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Every dynastic change, however well prepared and executed, marked a period of significant 
disturbance for the early modern body politic. The escalation of change into a full–scale 
political crisis was a possibility always likely to prey on contemporaries’ minds. The 
succession of Philip III of Spain following the death of his father Philip II on 13 September 
1598 was no exception.1 The atmosphere in Madrid and the other centres of power across the 
Habsburg global monarchy was giddy with anticipation, hope and concern. The new king was 
expected to bring new faces and new ideas to the government of the monarquía Hispánica. The 
representatives of the old and the new regime began measuring up to one another in earnest. 
                                                          
1  For this period, see Antonio FEROS, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598–1621, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. For political debate later in the seventeenth century, Héloïse HERMANT, 
Guerres de plumes. Publicité et cultures politiques dans l’Espagne de XVIIe siècle, Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 
2012. For new approaches to the notion of a public sphere in early modern Europe – before and beyond Habermas 
– see also the contributions in Massimo ROSPOCHER (ed.), Beyond the Public Sphere: Opinions, Publics, Spaces 
in Early Modern Europe, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012.  
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This period of transition from one regime to the next spawned much sparring for power, 
gossip, debate and a political literature of its own. On the news of the old king’s death political 
commentators began to dissect the rule of Philip II as well as divine the character and intentions 
of his son and heir. The Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1535–1624) was one of many writers jostling 
to shape the outlook and the future direction of the government of Philip III.2 His contribution 
to the debate, however, stands out for the way in which he pinpointed issues and intellectual 
trends that would steer debate well into the seventeenth century and leave their mark on Spanish 
political discourse  
 Mariana chose a traditional genre to give air to his hopes and fears and proffer counsel 
to Philip III and his advisors. His mirror–of–princes was published under the title De rege et 
regis institutione libri tres in Toledo in 1599 and dedicated to the new king.3 Despite its generic 
title, the treatise is no dry rehearsal of altogether familiar views concerning the virtues and 
vices of princes. Instead, what emerges is a complex and challenging, sometimes uneven 
analysis that sorts the chaff from the wheat of contemporary political thought. The treatise 
represents a searching, perceptive and often courageous discussion of the political constitution 
of the monarquía Hispánica as a ‘composite’ or ‘poly–centric’ body politic: a monarchy 
composed of semi–independent territories as politically and culturally diverse as they were 
distant from one another geographically.4 Mariana examines in how far political thinking had 
to change and what kind of approach to governance was needed and had to be encouraged if 
the monarchy of Philip III was to survive and flourish. 
This overarching concern of the author becomes apparent as the argument unfolds. 
Mariana intended to support and develop a specific mode of governance – John H. Elliott has 
called it the ‘Habsburg style of government’ – commensurate to the mammoth task of 
                                                          
2 For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Juan de Mariana’s political thought, see Harald E. BRAUN, Juan 
de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007; for informed discussion 
also Domenico FERRARO, Tradizione e ragione in Juan de Mariana, Milan: Franco Angeli Libri, 1989; Harro 
HÖPFL, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c.1540–1630, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
3 Juan de MARIANA, De rege et regis institutione libri tres, Toledo: Pedro Rodríguez, 1599. All citations in Latin 
from this edition. For a modern critical translation into Spanish, see Juan de MARIANA, La dignidad real y la 
educación del rey (De rege et regis institutione), edición y estudio preliminar (El Padre Juan de Mariana, un 
humanista precursor del constitucionalismo) de Luis SÁNCHEZ AGESTA, Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, 1981. 
4 For the current debate concerning the shift from describing the Habsburg monarchy as a ‘composite monarchy’ 
– a term and concept coined by Helmut Koenigsberger – to defining it as a ‘poly–centric monarchy’, see Pedro 
CARDIM, Tamar HERZOG, José Javier RUIZ IBÁÑEZ, Gaetano SABATINI (eds), Polycentric Monarchies. 
How Did Early Modern Spain And Portugal Achieve And Maintain A Global Hegemony?, Eastbourne: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2012; Manuel HERRERO (ed.), Repúblicas y republicanismo en la Europa moderna (siglos 
XVI–XVII), Madrid: Fonde de Cultura Económica, 2017. 
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managing a polity of such complexity.5 This consensus precluded the adoption of rigid notions 
of secular monarchical power or ‘sovereignty’ that drew heavily on Roman law and would 
come to be defined as ‘absolute monarchy’ or ‘absolutism’.6 In order to work, this consensus 
required respectful acceptance of the plurality of jurisdictions, political systems and cultures 
on the part of the crown, and formal acknowledgement of royal authority on the part of the 
elites in the different territories of the monarchy.7 In other words, it required a preference for 
cautious negotiation and a commitment to compromise on all sides. This ‘Habsburg style’ of 
governance was reflected in matching modes of political thinking and communication, and a 
matching political language that evolved over the course of the later sixteenth and especially 
the seventeenth century. Generally, this political language was characterised by a growing 
willingness to accommodate the ambiguous and often perturbing reality of politics 
intellectually as well as morally.8 De rege et regis institutione is Mariana’s attempt to embrace 
the reality of secular politics, defend and define this style of governance, and to re–cast the 
corresponding political language for the reign of Philip III.9 His approach and many of his ideas 
on monarchical government and governance found their echo in the works of Diego Saavedra 
Fajardo or Pedro Portocarrero y Guzmán. 
The first book of De rege set outs a political ontology of monarchical authority that 
gives structure and direction to the treatise and serves a twofold purpose. Mariana examines 
and dismisses attempts by contemporary Catholic and Reformed theologians and jurisprudents 
to lodge ‘supreme and absolute power’ in the king. He also constructs a language of Catholic 
                                                          
5 John H. ELLIOTT, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”, Past and Present 137, 1992, p. 48-71. 
6 Mariana’s treatise is a good example for contemporary analysis exploring and exposing the weaknesses at the 
heart of early modern conceptualisations of sovereignty. The heuristic value of ‘absolutism’ has diminished over 
the last decades not least because the term tends to obscure the mismatch between doctrine and pretension exposed 
by the study of the reality of early modern monarchical government. See briefly Mark GOLDIE, “Absolutism”, 
in George KLOSKO (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, p. 282-295; Matthew HENSHALL, The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in 
Early Modern Monarchy, London: Longman, 1992.  
7 On the performative and mystical side of early modern kingship, see, for instance, Alejandro CAÑEQUE, The 
King’s Living Image. The Culture and Politics of Vice–Regal Power in Colonial Mexico, Abingdon and New 
York: Routledge, 2004. On the fragility of vice–regal and regal power in the far–flung corners of the Hispanic 
monarchy, for instance, Angela BALLONE, The 1624 Tumult of Mexico in Perspective (c. 1620–1650). Authority 
and Conflict Resolution in the Iberian Atlantic, Leiden: Brill, 2017. 
8 For the later seventeenth century, see Xavier GIL PUJOL, La Fábrica de la Monarquía. Traza y conversación 
de la Monarquía de España de los Reyes Católicos y los Austrias, Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2016; 
Harald E. BRAUN, “El pensamiento político español del siglo XVII: ¿declive y decadencia, o sabio 
reconocimiento de la complejidad de la vida política?”, Classiques Garnier [forthcoming]. 
9 Mariana confines himself to the histories of European, mainly Mediterranean powers. In his view, Spanish 
possessions in Europe and overseas are no different in terms of the mode of governance required to master and 
marshal their political energies. His analysis lacks the geopolitical vision and detail that is the hallmark of 
Giovanni Botero’s political–theoretical oeuvre. On Botero see now Romain DESCENDRE, L'Etat du Monde: 
Giovanni Botero entre raison d'Etat et géopolitique, Geneva: Droz, 2009; Harald E. BRAUN, “Knowledge and 
Counsel in Giovanni Botero’s Ragion di stato”, Journal of Jesuit Studies, 4 (2), 2017, p. 270–89. 
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political prudence or reason of state. 10 His aim is to correct and replace what he perceives as a 
legal and limited way of thinking about the nature and exercise of monarchical authority. The 
second and the third book of the treatise anticipate and comment on many issues those involved 
in Spanish politics – Philip III’s own courtiers and officials as well as foreign observers and a 
wider public – would ponder for years to come. He does not shy away from discussing 
controversial topics such as the role of the royal favourite, the Duque de Lerma, or the need to 
increase the political and social cohesion of a disparate collection of dynastic territories through 
the creation of an imperial elite bureaucracy.11 He puts forward bold proposals to protect the 
realms of Philip III from continual ruinous wars and fiscal crisis, including a plan to establish 
the bishops of Castile as treasurers of the realm and auditors of secular governance.12 In the 
following, I will focus on the first book of De rege and on some of the main features of his 
account of the origins of monarchical rule and his conceptualisation of political prudence for 
the ruler of a poly-centric monarchy. His assessment of the Hispanic monarchy at the turn of 
the century and even more so the way in which he conceptualized the Spanish body politic and 
political language confirm Juan de Mariana as a distinctive voice in early modern Spanish and 
European political discourse.  
 
THE FALL OF MAN AND THE ORIGINS OF MONARCHICAL RULE 
 
There are several crucial components to Mariana’s construction of a political language to 
complement the Habsburg style of governance. The starting point and the keystone of his 
argument overall, however, is the distinct political ontology – a theological–philosophical 
account of the origin of political power – developed primarily in book one of De rege. Mariana 
                                                          
10 I am not able to relate Mariana and De rege to the wider European and Spanish debates connecting Tacitus, 
Machiavelli and razón de estado (a term which Machiavelli never used, but with which he became associated). 
See BRAUN, Mariana, passim (also for older literature); GIL PUJOL, Fábrica; and Id, “Las fuerzas del Rey. La 
generación que leyó Botero”, in Martir RIZZO et al. (eds), La forze del principe. Recursos instrumentos y límites 
en la práctica del poder soberano en los territories del monarquía hispánica, Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 
2004, p. 969–1022; the contributions in Salvador RUFINO et. al (eds), La razón de estado en la España moderna, 
Valencia: Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, 2000; Keith HOWARD, The Reception of Machiavelli 
in Early Modern Spain, Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2014. Due to its tight focus on the Florentine, Howard’s useful 
study of a sample of writers tends to overstate the impact of the reception of Machiavelli on Spanish political 
discourse.  
11 MARIANA, De rege, for instance, book 3, chapter 4, p. 292-301. On Philip III, the Duque de Lerma, and royal 
favouritism in Spain, see FEROS, Kingship and Favouritism; Patrick WILLIAMS, The Great Favourite: The 
Duke of Lerma and the court and government of Philip III of Spain, 1598–1621, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2006; and the essays in John H. ELLIOTT and Lawrance W. BROCKLISS (eds), The World of 
the Favourite, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.  
12 Mariana sets out his ideas concerning the future role of the Castilian episcopate in secular government in the 
last chapters of books one to three of De rege. See BRAUN, Juan de Mariana, chapter 5, p. 135-159. 
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uses his theological expertise to supplant the Thomist–Aristotelian framework so familiar from 
authors of the Spanish second scholastic with an intellectual construct that is distinctly 
Augustinian in tone.13 The argument of De rege rests on a strong Augustinian emphasis on the 
corruption of human nature after the Fall of Man. Mariana is possibly the only Jesuit author to 
describe civil society and its defining features as emerging from a historical and secular process 
unfolding mostly outside the boundaries of the law of nature: through the progress of human 
corruption over an unspecified period of time after the Fall.14 It is this political ontology 
moulded from strands of Augustinian, especially Scotist strands of scholastic theology as well 
as Ciceronian and Stoic humanism that allowed Mariana to reorganise contemporary political 
thinking and develop his version of Catholic reason of state. 
The first few passages of Mariana’s discussion of the origin of society still appear to 
paraphrase familiar scholastic Aristotelian and Ciceronian lore.15 The animal sociabile, he 
says, was able to compensate for the many weaknesses incurred in the wake of the Fall through 
the ability to communicate and collaborate. Mariana, though, immediately qualifies this 
statement. Human achievements in the arts, medicine and war – things commonly held to 
“distinguish, enlighten and adorn human life” – are mere deception and merely express the vain 
struggle to escape misery and death. Here, and throughout De rege, Seneca and other ancients 
provide pithy expressions that capture Mariana’s Augustinian appraisal of the human 
condition: “Man enters into life shedding tears and never ceases to do so until the day he dies”.16 
This Augustinian turn feeds a distinct sense of temporality and a corresponding 
dynamic of historical decline. “Time and the wickedness of man”, Mariana repeatedly states, 
drew humanity ever further away from its original perfect edenic nature. The Jesuit moves on 
to an account of the origin of civil society and political power as a historical narrative, a history 
of the progress of human corruption post lapsu. For a period after the Fall, Mariana states, the 
                                                          
13 Mariana’s approach clearly sets him apart from other authors of reason of state like Giovanni Botero or the 
Flemling Justus Lipsius. On Mariana’s political ontology BRAUN, Juan de Mariana, especially chapter one, 
p.15–41; Id., “San Agustín, Juan de Mariana, y la epistemología política española, siglo XVI", en Agustín en 
España (siglos XVI y XVII): Aspectos de Política, Historia y Cultura, ed. Marina Mestre ZARAGOZÁ y Philippe 
RABATÉ, CRITICÓN, 118, 2013, p. 99–112; a sensitive reading in Ferraro, Tradizione.  
14 A comparison between the political ontologies of Juan de Mariana, Luis the Molina SJ and the humanist 
jurisprudent Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca (1512–1569) might be useful. For the contexts, themes and strands 
of early modern Jesuit political thinking generally, see HÖPFL, Jesuit Political Thought; on Vázquez de 
Menchaca, see Annabel BRETT, Liberty, Right and Nature. Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 165–204.  
15 For the following, see MARIANA, De rege, p. 16–21. Compare with the account in Tomas de Aquino, De 
regimine principum, book one, chapter one [for instance, Santo Tomás de Aquino, La monarquía, trasl. Laureano 
ROBLES CARCEDO y Án CHUECA, Madrid: Tecnos, 2007]. 
16 MARIANA, De rege, p. 18. SENECA, Ad Polybium de consolatione, 4.3. 
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“first men” were ignorant of law, civil authority and private ownership.17 When numbers grew, 
and more and more families gathered and supported one another, “natural instinct and impulse” 
(naturae instinctus et impulsus) steered people to accept the counsel of their elders. This was 
still a life of  blissful, oblivious Arcadian innocence, though, a time when “men worked for the 
common store, and earth Herself, unbidden, yielded all the more fully”.18  
This Golden Age ended when after a period of time some men became aware of their 
ability to kill and rob their neighbours.19 In fact, these “bands of murderers” were the first to 
step outside the instinctive, family–based communities established soon after the Fall and form 
what came to be called a populus or (proto–) societas. The final step in Mariana’s sombre 
account is the “mutual pact” or “covenant” (mutuum foedus societatis) by which families 
placed themselves under a rector and established the fully formed civilis societas to protect 
themselves.20  
These “first rulers”, the Jesuit makes clear, guided their people by means of benevolent 
patriarchal auctoritas rather than princely potestas. They still possessed a degree of moral 
integrity, dignity and reputation that allowed them to dispense with the need for laws and 
officers of law or any other means of coercion. The people, in turn, did not yet need to check 
the power of their rectores by means of laws or be wary of their actions. These rulers of “the 
first race of man” considered themselves quasi multitudinis custodes or “mere guardians of the 
people”.21  
Characteristically, Mariana does not develop the Roman law concept of custodia, which 
included notions of liability in the case of neglect of duty, into a fully–fledged theory of 
political contract. In fact, the point he intended to make was that good rulership was based 
exclusively on personal integrity and reputation as opposed to notions of power defined by law 
and implemented through law. This and other concepts Mariana lifted from Roman law serve 
to illustrate a primeval and moral relationship between guardian and people characterised by 
the absence of potestas or coercive power as opposed to a secular and juridical relationship 
based on the exercise of potestas by a prince. The primeval mutuum foedus societatis, 
correspondingly, describes nothing more than the decision of a body of free men (universitas) 
to accept the guidance of an individual able to lead in war and settle disputes solely by his 
moral integrity and sense of equity. 
                                                          
17 Mariana is paraphrasing CICERO; see, for instance, De inventione, 1.2.2. 
18 MARIANA, De rege, p. 17; quoting VIRGIL, Georgica, 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 20-22, 23-34. 
20 Ibid. Mariana appears to invoke the Biblical foedus duplex; see BRAUN, Mariana, p. 28-29. 
21 Ibid., p. 23. 
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 The effect of human corruption growing over time, however, soon affected the rule of 
the rectores. While Mariana assures his readers that monarchy or single rule is “closest to the 
true nature of things [before the Fall]”, he emphasises that it is, at the same time, the product 
of original sin and a prime manifestation of its creeping, debilitating effects.22 He wryly 
remarks that, eventually, “[s]ome kings, either impelled by greed for more possessions or 
incited by ambition for prise and glory, sometimes even exasperated by wrongs” subjugated 
other “free peoples” (gentes liberae; civitates liberae) and built the first empires (imperia).23 
Nimrod, Ninus, Cyrus, Alexander the Great, Caesar and other founders of empires so much 
admired in “vulgar opinion” in his view are nothing but “plunderers” and “tyrants”. The first 
chapters of De rege establishes empire, the rule of kings, and even hereditary monarchy as 
products of original sin and vehicles of the gradual obliteration of the original freedom and 
happiness humanity enjoyed before the Fall. 
 The Aristotelian and Ciceronian trimmings of the introductory paragraphs of book one 
cannot disguise the fact that Mariana’s political ontology clearly and deliberately sets him apart 
from the Thomist–Aristotelian theory of a natural progress from patriarchal familia to civitas 
perfecta. Saint Thomas Aquinas had suggested that civil society, political authority and private 
ownership arose from “first precepts” of a law of nature (prima praecepta) that had survived 
Adam and Eve’s fall from grace relatively untouched and were deeply embedded in “the hearts 
of men”. Human nature had lost the special gifts of divine grace and divine justice that had 
perfected it before the Fall, but was still able to partake in a pura natura by means of natural 
reason. Aquinas’ followers, including most of the theologians commonly associated with the 
‘School of Salamanca’, elaborated this contention and insisted that human reason and those 
precepts of natural law relevant to human sociability had not been markedly affected by 
original sin.24 
Mariana, in contrast, openly rejects the idea of societas civilis and its accessories as 
inevitable products of an essentially pre–lapsarian ‘pure nature’. Echoing John Duns Scotus 
and Franciscan traditions in scholastic neo–Augustinian theology, the Jesuit states that civil 
society, political authority, dominium and the laws that regulate society came into existence 
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 23–24. 
23 Ibid., p.24. 
24 The complex relationship between nature and grace in Aquinas and the second scholastic continues to be a 
matter of theological debate. For Mariana’s critique of Thomist doctrine in the context of his theory of the origin 
of civil society and monarchical authority, see BRAUN, Juan de Mariana, p. 22–26. For positions and debate 
within the ‘School of Salamanca’, see Juan BELDA PLANS, La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la 
teología en el siglo XVI, Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2000; a helpful discussion of relevant dogma 
and scholastic debate, Heinrich KÖSTER, Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde in der Scholastik (Handbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte, II/3b), Freiburg: Herder, 1979. 
8 
 
not as the continuation and extension of a pre–lapsarian law of nature but as acts of positive 
law through human deliberation and consent. This Augustinian dictat of the all–pervasive 
effects of original sin ensured that every human thought and every human act was conceived 
and enacted sub specie lapsus. The secular political sphere, according to Juan de Mariana is 
‘natural’ only in the sense that it is the sphere of pervasive corruption of human nature and 
activity. The body politic exists in the civitas terrena. It exists as the result and as the fluid, 
varied expression of original sin in historical time. 
 
THE TRUE NATURE OF MONARCHICAL POWER 
 
The consequences of Mariana’s political ontology are momentous for his view of the 
relationship between divine, natural and positive law and for his definition and exercise of 
legitimate political authority. To assess his position, it is useful to turn to one of the first 
sentences in the Decretum Gratiani. Gratian had claimed that “ius naturale est, quod in lege et 
evangelio continetur”.25 Canon lawyers had subsequently toiled to expand the connection 
between divine and natural law and establish a metahistorical and universal juridical 
framework that incorporated the whole of Christianity and extended the reach of papal power 
over secular rulers. Civilians and other secular jurists, on the other hand, had taken a defensive 
position and sought to maintain the universality of Roman law and the autonomy of secular 
law generally.26 By the end of the sixteenth century, it was clear that the enterprise of the papal 
lawyers had failed. The Reformation and Counter–Reformation had strengthened the hand of 
territorial rulers and their jurisconsulti and had reinforced the idea and the practice of secular, 
especially Roman law as an autonomous expression of natural law and a reflection of the divine 
will. In Habsburg Spain, regalistas like Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla (1547–1605) or 
Francisco Salgado de Somóza (1595–1665) exemplified this long trend towards an 
understanding and practice of monarchical power as grounded in ‘absolute sovereignty’. 
Crucial to the respective enterprises of papal jurisprudents as well as their civilian 
opponents was the shared notion of the text – the Bible and the Corpus iuris civilis, first and 
foremost – as ratio scripta: the notion that specific texts were representations of natural and 
                                                          
25 GRATIAN, Decretum, D. I, c.I. 
26 On the complex relationship between canon and Roman law as a main driver of the process of the secularization 
of juridical thought from the thirteenth century onwards, see Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985; Paolo PRODI, Una 
storia della giustizia. Dal pluralism dei fori al moderno dualismo tra scienza e diritto, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000. 
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divine law accessible to human understanding and interpretation by means of natural reason.27 
This notion of a smooth transmission of divine precepts for the benefit of a fallen humanity 
enabled scholastic theologians and Catholic secular jurisprudents to agree that political order 
and legitimate monarchical authority were rooted in invariable principles of natural law. It was 
crucial for shielding legitimate hereditary monarchical power from the ramifications of 
Calvinist and Catholic resistance theory.  
The definition of secular monarchical power in Francisco Suárez’s De legibus, ac Deo 
legislatore, for instance, rested on the claim that royal authority originated in law of nature 
effectively undiminished by original sin.28 Historical experience (usus), Suárez says, shows 
that potestas civilis, “although a natural attribute of a perfect human community, nevertheless 
does not reside immutably therein, but may be taken from that community by its own consent 
or through some other just means and transferred to another [authority].”29 In this sense, “the 
governing power (…) derives from human law [and] the very institution of monarchy derives 
from human beings.”30 Suárez acknowledges the historicity of the actual act of constituting a 
monarchical government when he admits “that according to the pact or convention made 
between the kingdom and the king, his power is greater or lesser.” However, he is quick to 
denounce the suggestion that “royal power is derived from human law alone” and that “the 
kingdom must be superior to the king, because it gives him power”. This idea could lead to the 
further, untenable conclusion that the respublica could depose or change the king if it wished.31 
This train of thinking, he is at pains to emphasise, is “totally false”. To press his point, he 
deploys the powerful analogy between a man selling himself into slavery and a free people who 
transfer their original power to their chosen ruler: 
 
“If a private individual who surrenders himself by sale to be the slave to another person, 
so that the master–slave relationship that is established has an entirely human origin; but, 
                                                          
27 On this point, see the work of Pierre LEGENDRE, for instance, Le Désir politique de Dieu. Étude sur les 
montages de l'État et du droit, Paris: Fayard, 1988.  
28 For contexts and themes of Suárez political philosophy, also further literature, see HÖPFL, Jesuit Political 
Thought.  
29 Francisco SUÁREZ, De legibus, ac Deo legislatore, Coimbra: D. Gómez de Loureyo, 1612, III, 3, 7: “[…] licet 
haec potestas sit veluti proprietas naturalis perfectae communitatis hominum, tum talis est, nihilominus non esse 
in ea immutabiliter, sed per consensum ipsius communitatis, vel per aliam iustam viam posse illa privari, & in 
alium transferri.” 
30 Ibid. III, 4, 5: “Nam potestas haec gubernativa politicae secundum se considerata, sine dubio est ex Deo; ut dixi, 
tamen esse in hoc homine est ex donatione ipsius rei publicae, […] ergo sub ea ratione est de iure humano. Item 
quod regimen talis reipublicae […] sit monarchicum, est ex hominum institutione, […]. “ 
31 Ibid. III, 4, 5: “Obiici vero potest, quia hinc sequitur, potestatem regiam esse ex solo iure humano […]. Item 
sequitur, regnum esse supra regem, quia illi dedit potestatem. Unde ulteri sit, posse, si velit illum deponere, vel 
mutare, quod omnino falsum est.”  
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this contract having been established, the slave must obey his master by divine and 
natural law.”32  
 
Once power is handed over, the prince “takes the place of God, and natural law constrains us 
to obey him.”33 The people, on the other hand, “by granting [that] power (…) subjects itself to 
the king and loses its previous liberty.”34 Suárez is eager to stress that the fact that the transfer 
of power was made “under the law of nature” makes it irreversible: “[…] the transfer of this 
power is not an act of delegation, but rather a form of alienation or an unlimited surrender of 
the whole power which was in the community.”35  
 
This brief discussion of passages from Suárez’s compendious De lege suffices, I hope, to 
emphasise the difference between Mariana and mainstream scholastic understanding of the 
relationship between monarchical government and natural law. Our Jesuit brutally disrupts the 
notion that a conversation between divine law, natural law and human natural reason could 
have continued to shape human positive law and human institutions after the Fall. That 
conversation ended with the Fall. Consequently, Mariana adopts the civilian notion of natural 
law as a basic instinct of self–preservation or “the law which is shared by man and beast”.36 
Legitimate political authority is no longer the articulation of “first precepts” of the law of nature 
in historical time. Legitimate monarchical authority and the laws and institutions created to 
correct and restrain the monarch are mere expressions of human corruption in secular time.  
At a crucial point in his argument, towards the end of the book one, Mariana considers 
the position taken by Suárez and other exponents of the idea that the potestas of the monarch 
comes from natural law and cannot be challenged by subjects.37 He sets out to dissect the 
arguments put forward by “men outstanding in their reputation for erudition” who want to 
bestow suprema et maxima potestas sine exceptione on monarchs.38 Some of these viri eruditi 
                                                          
32 Ibid., III, 4, 6: “Sicut quando unus homo privatus se vendit, & tradit alteri in servum, dominium illud ab homine 
simpliciter est; illo vero contractu supposito, iure divino & naturali obligatur servus parere Domino.”  
33 Ibid.: “[…] aliud est supposita translatione huius potestatis in regem, iam gerere vicem Dei, & naturale ius 
obligare ad parendum illi.” Also: Ibid.: “[…] supposita translatione huius potestatis in regem, iam gerere vicem 
Dei, & naturale ius obligare ad parendum illi.” 
34 Ibid.: “Et ita patet responsio ad confirmationem, negando simpliciter sequelam, quia translata potestate in 
regem, per illam efficitur superior etiam regno, quod illam dedit, quia dando illam se subiecit, & priori libertate 
privavit, ut in exemplo de servo, servata proportione, constat.”  
35 Ibid. III, 4, 11: “[…] translatio huius potestatis a republica in principem non est delegatio sed quasi alienatio 
[…] ut per se vel per alios utatur eo modo quo illi magis videbitur expedire.” 
36 MARIANA, De rege, p. 21. Paraphrasing ULPIAN, Dig., 1.1.1. A definition rejected by Suárez and natural law 
theorists generally. 
37 The discussion is concentrated in chapters eight and nine of book one of De rege, p. 87–99 and p. 99–107 
respectively. 
38 MARIANA, De rege, p. 91–92. 
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draw on canon law to claim that princes are like bishops whose authority is greater than that of 
the cathedral chapter as a corporate body (universi in diocesi). They distort canon law and 
falsely deduce that “the king is greater not only than the individual citizens but also than the 
whole corporate body of the people”.39 Others, he observes, draw false analogies between the 
rule of the monarch and the despotic rule of the paterfamilias over his family. This and similar 
comments are a swipe at the French politique and jurisprudent Jean Bodin, who had established 
the Aristotelian family as “the true source and the origin of the respublica” and compared the 
indivisible and unlimited power of the monarch to that of the Aristotelian paterfamilias.40 The 
Angevin jurist, disturbed by the disaster of the French Wars of Religion, declared that 
monarchical sovereignty originated in natural law and that the monarch is morally bound to 
respect the precepts of natural law, but that legitimate monarchical cannot be challenged on the 
grounds of natural or customary law. 
Notwithstanding profound differences concerning the nature of law and the nature and 
exercise of monarchical power, Bodin, Suárez and other early modern theorists of monarchical 
sovereignty shared a determination to anchor absolute kingship in natural law and protect it 
from any form of resistance from below. Bodin had sought to soften his stance by 
distinguishing between monarchie royale as one in which the monarch obeys the laws of nature 
and the subjects retain their natural liberty and property, and monarchie seigneuriale in which 
the monarch uses force to make himself master over the persons and properties of his subjects 
and governs them as the paterfamilias governs his slaves.41 Yet he had also insisted that the 
difference was merely one between two different modes of governance and did not stem from 
the nature of absolute sovereignty itself.  
Mariana summarily dismisses these and similar arguments as prime examples for 
philosophical–juridical sophistry. He exposes a flaw in the argument which scholastic 
conceptualization of sovereignty shared with Bodin: the Jesuit points out that if potestas is 
firmly rooted in the monarch through natural law and if respect for the person and property of 
subjects and the customs and laws of the land is merely a moral obligation, then monarchy can 
all–too–easily descend into tyranny. Mariana scorns theologians and jurisprudents alike for 
                                                          
39 Mariana invokes a well–known maxim from medieval canon: rex maior singulis minor universis. The formula 
epitomizes the notion of a corporation (universitas) as a persona ficta or single person by fiction of law. The 
universitas was made up of men in their corporate aspect (universi), that is, men who could act only as a corporate 
whole or through their representatives. According to this legal maxim, the king is inferior to men acting as a 
corporate whole (universi), but superior to any private individual (singulus). 
40 In his Six Livres de la République, first published Paris: Jacques du Puy, 1576, I.2. On the ways in which 
Bodin’s oeuvre was translated into other European contexts and discourses, see Howell A. LLOYD (ed.), The 
Reception of Bodin, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013. 
41 BODIN, République, II.2.  
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potentially turning subjects – he uses the terms subditus and civis interchangeably – into 
slaves.42 Wittingly or unwittingly, the viri eruditi indulge the blind ambition of princes because 
they ignore political reality and they lack historical experience.  
Mariana does not aim to make a point of universal theological-legal doctrine. He readily 
concedes that any respublica can bestow suprema et maxima potestas sine exceptione in their 
ruler. Some peoples, for instance the gentes barbaras mentioned in Aristotle’s Politics, decided 
to be ruled in a manner “that verges on tyranny”. Society and government originate and exist 
as acts of human positive law rather than the result of a process in natural law, and therefore 
vary greatly from people to people and over the course of the lifespan of any one respublica. 
Most peoples throughout history, though, Mariana observes, chose to limit and control the 
power of monarchs by means of laws and institutions. The Spartans introduced the ephorate, 
the Aragonese created a tribune or iusticia to “defend their laws and privileges from the 
ambition of kings and nobles”. Those laws themselves, the different processes of making law, 
and the different institutions established to protect the people and laws of the land, though, are 
also deeply, invariably affected by original sin. Laws, Mariana declares, are usually inspired 
by sudden whim and the foolhardiness of the populus and are the product of fortuna more likely 
than sapientia.43 Mariana does not abandon his Augustinian perspective on humanity at any 
point in his argument.  
Still, the Jesuit maintains that “[t]he power of the king, if it is legitimate, always has its 
source in the citizens […]”.44 ” To state the contrary, he states, is to “mistake the child for the 
parent” or “the river for the source”.45 Yet the analogy of parent and child or spring and river 
again does not translate into a juridical construct of ‘popular sovereignty’. Mariana does not 
turn the notion of monarchical suprema potestas on its head and place it in the corporate body 
of the people or universitas instead. French Huguenot or Catholic Leaguer authors like François 
Hotman and Jean Boucher had identified magistrates as the maior or sanior pars reipublicae 
and had made them the hinges of their conceptualization of popular sovereignty and a 
concomitant right of a people to resist a legitimate prince who had turned into a tyrant. Mariana 
has no track with the idea that any part of the secular body politic other than the king, and least 
of all secular magistrates or the nobility or cortes of Castile, could represent the people as a 
                                                          
42 MARIANA, De rege, p. 91. 
43 Ibid., p. 87–88. Mariana’s careful and differentiates assessment of customary law – mores or consuetudines – 
is integral to his argument, but cannot be discussed here; see BRAUN, Juan de Mariana, p. 43-60. 
44 Ibid., p. 88: “Me tamen auctore, quando regia potestas, si legitima est, a civibus ortum habet, iis concedentibus 
primi Reges in quaque republica in rerum fastigio collocati sunt: eam legibus & sanctionibus circumscribent ne 
sese nimia efferat, luxuriet in subditorum perniciem, degeneretque in tyrannidem”.  
45 Ibid., p. 90. 
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corporate body and exercise a right of resistance on their behalf. When it comes to political 
process, he sourly remarks, historical experience is unambiguous and tells us that:  
 
“[…] in omni populi parte improborum numerus sit multo maximus, si rerum potestas 
penes plures fuerit, in omni deliberatione pars senior a peiori superabitur: neque enim 
suffragia ponderantur, sed numerantur, ac ne fieri quidem aliter potest.”46 
 
Just as casually as Mariana discarded the notion of suprema potestas in a king, he rules out that 
a similar power could be vested in the people. The ground is the same: the corruption of 
humanity penetrates every layer of the body politic. It is easier to manage tyrannical corruption 
if power is vested in an individual than if it is in the hands of the multitudo.47 Whether suprema 
potestas is lodged in the prince or the people is, ultimately, irrelevant. The notion of suprema 
potestas, Mariana insists, is misleading and destructive in principle. In a passage important for 
our understanding of the argument of De rege, Mariana turns to his intermittent interlocutor 
and states:  
 
“Quod si pergas curiose rogare, sit ne in arbitrio reipublica plenam sine exceptione 
potestatem (…) Principi dare? Equidem non magnopere contendam, neque in magno 
ponam discrimine utrovis modo sentiatur: modo illud concedatur imprudenter [my 
emphasis] facturam rempubliam si dederit: Principem temerarie accepturum, per quod 
subditi e liberis servi evadant, (…) principatus degeneret in tyrannidem.” 48  
 
It is worth lingering over this passage. It clearly indicates the rationale of Mariana’s argument. 
A people can offer plena sine exceptione potestatis and a monarch can accept it. It would be 
an act of destructive foolhardiness on both sides. The study of history has brought Mariana to 
the point in his argument where he point-blank refuses to discuss the origins, scope and exercise 
of political power and authority in terms of legal doctrine. The incessant, inconclusive debate 
among jurisprudents and theologians merely serves the ambitions of princes or nobles and 
fosters political conflict. Mariana can see only one way forward: he changes the terms of the 
debate about the nature and limits of monarchical power from jurisprudence to political 
prudence.  
 
                                                          
46 Ibid, p. 32.  
47 For Mariana’s discussion of the right way to manage and manipulate the populus, a differentiating critique of 
Machiavelli, see especially book three of De rege, chapter fourteen [De prudentia], p. 387-406. 
48 MARIANA, De rege, p. 94. This is part of Mariana’s discussion and rejection of the lex regia, a juridical theme 
at the heart of early modern discourses of monarchical suprema potestas, towards the end of book one, chapter 
eight of his treatise.  
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THE PRUDENCE OF KINGS 
 
Throughout De rege, Mariana’s gaze is firmly on the king and on feasible and practical ways 
to ensure that monarchical government does neither descend into tyranny nor is wrongly 
perceived as tyrannical by a sizeable part of the body politic. The greatest danger to the 
Hispanic monarchy, or any other body politic for that matter, he states, is that a prince will be 
“deceived by the appearance of greater power […] and will not realize that power is secure 
only if it places a limit on its own strength.”49. Past and present experience, the Jesuit is keen 
to emphasize, tells us that subjects accept monarchical government as legitimate only if the 
monarch acts “within the bounds of moderation and self–restraint”. 50  
Mariana shares with Justus Lipsius the concept of virtue as a political affect, as an 
emotion that will solicit a powerful response in those who witness virtuous behaviour.51 If the 
monarch acts virtuously or is perceived as acting virtuously, Mariana is frequently and 
noticeably ambiguous about this point,52 the auctoritas of the ruler and the benevolentia of his 
subjects towards his person and enterprises will increase in tandem.53 He conceives of 
auctoritas as power without the coercive trappings of power, and defines benevolentia as the 
emotion the monarch should seek to foster in his subjects. “True power” is not a matter of 
theological speculation or legal doctrine, but a matter of whether the prince can manage his 
own needs and emotions and those of his subjects in a way that ensures political stability. 
Mariana agrees that the most powerful monarchs, including the king of Spain, can act 
as if they were legibus solutus and use force and intimidation to get their way. Yet, to do so, 
he assures his readers, is likely both to corrupt the prince and to destroy the people’s respect 
for his person and dynasty. Once the people have lost respect for their monarchy, they will no 
longer obey, support and protect him.54 If, on the other hand, Philip III “permits neither himself 
nor anyone else to be mightier than the laws”, Mariana promises, the king will maintain his 
                                                          
49 Ibid., p. 95. 
50 Ibid., p. 94–95: “Qui tum demum regius est, si intra modestiae & mediocritatis fines se contineat: excessu 
potestatis, quam imprudentes indies augere satagunt, minuitur penitusque corrumpitur. Nos stulti maiores 
potentiae specie decepti dilabimur in contrarium, non satis considerantes eam demum tutam esse potentiam, quae 
viribus modum imponit. Neque enim ut in divitiis, quo amplius augentur, eo locupletiores cuadimus, ita in regio 
principatu contingit, sed contrarium. cum Princeps volentibus debeat imperare, civium benevolentiam colligere, 
eorum commodis serivire: imperio exacerbato & Regis benevolentiam exuet, & potestatem imbecillitate mutabit.” 
51 We have no evidence that Mariana read Lipsius, though their lines of thought converge in many instances. The 
introductory passages of chapter nine, book one of De rege could be read as a paraphrase of Justus LIPSIUS, 
Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae libri sex, first published Leiden: Plantin, 1589, II, 15. 
52 See, for instance, the discussion of Scipio Africanus feigning piety, MARIANA, De rege, p. 258-60. 
53 MARIANA, De rege, p. 57–58, p. 60, p. 100–103. See LIPSIUS, Politicorum, IV.8 
54 Ibid., p. 393. 
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authority and legitimacy across the monarchy and “inspire men to serve him and defend his 
honour with their lives as they would defend their wives and children” and “to assist him from 
public and private funds”.55 To show or make a show of respect for the different legal and 
political traditions of the territories and peoples of the Hispanic monarchy, Mariana suggests, 
is a matter of self–interest as much as moral obligation.  
Here, and throughout his treatise, the Jesuit parries notions of suprema potestas with 
variations on the theme of parent and child or source and river to capture the reality of the 
relationship between a monarch and a people. Prudence nurtured on historical experience, 
Mariana repeatedly reminds the reader, shows that the monarch depends on his subjects as 
much as they depend on him, if not more. Fiscal, political and military power and even the 
physical survival of individual rulers and dynasties hinge on the benevolentia of the subjects. 
History, not least the history of Castile offers Mariana plenty of examples and archetypes of 
prudent kingship to bolster his argument.  
One such example for prudent conduct in a king is Alfonso VIII of Castile.56 During 
the siege of Cuenca in 1177, close to victory over the Muslim enemy but short of funds, Alfonso 
asked the Castilian nobility for a voluntary grant of money. The count of Lara took the king’s 
plea as part of a plan to end the exemption of nobles from taxation. He openly conspired with 
other nobles to oppose the king, and publicly threatened Alfonso with war. Alfonso realized 
that he was in danger of being branded a tyrant and do lasting damage to his authority. He 
quickly withdrew his appeal.  
Mariana makes clear that Alfonso had no hidden agenda and that his request for a 
merced was motivated solely by his crusading zeal. Throughout De rege, he is particularly 
critical of the Castilian nobility, its propensity to conspire and ruthless pursuit of personal 
advantage. The rulers of Castile, Mariana observes matter-of-factly, have always found it 
difficult or near impossible to impose new taxes without the consent of the populus or 
respublica.57 The fact that Alfonso VIII had good reason to ask for money and that the count 
of Lara was wrong to suspect the king of subterfuge, however, is not the point. Alfonso could 
have charged Lara with treason and escalated the conflict. Instead, the king chose to humble 
himself and demonstrate respect for established custom and the concerns of his subjects. While 
                                                          
55 Ibid., p. 101, p. 57–58.  
56 Ibid., p. 98–99. 
57 Ibid., p. 89: “Quod experimento comprobatur in Hispania, vectigalia imperare Regem non posse populo 
dissentiente.”  
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the siege lasted much longer than the king had wished, Mariana says, Alfonso’s decision 
preserved the peace and strengthened his authority in the long term.  
Mariana sums up his ideology of prudent kingship in an example from classical 
antiquity. The Spartan king Theopompus established the ephorate as a vehicle to gather support 
and consent from the respublica and by his action ensured the survival of Sparta at a 
particularly critical juncture in its history.58 Scolded by his wife for diminishing the power of 
his son and future king, Theopompus merely responded that though he may have left his heir 
with less power, he certainly left him with power more stable and secure. The Spartan, Mariana 
pithily observes, had realized that “princes, by placing reins on their fortune, rule themselves, 
and rule fortune and their subjects more easily.”59  
Mariana also has a warning from history ready at hand, an example “to demonstrate 
how great is the strength of the multitude angered with hatred for a ruler, and that the ill-will 
of the people results in the destruction of the prince”.60 He refers to the reign and fate of Henri 
III of France (reigned 1574-1589) as an example of a prince “deceived with an appearance of 
greater power, […] not giving the matter enough consideration, and not realising that power is 
finally safe only when it places a limit on its own strength.” A monarch, Mariana states 
categorically, should never try to force a project that the citizen will not approve, nor “should 
he oppose the angry multitude”, which “is like a torrent that destroys everything in its path”.61 
Henri ignored the counsel of prudence. He constantly violated the laws and customs of France, 
made the heretic Henri of Navarre heir to the throne, and provoked his people until they thought 
of him as a tyrant, a “monster from antiquity” like Nero and Caligula. In 1589, he was murdered 
by the Dominican monk Jacques Clement as a result.  
Mariana’s observation that “a great many people” have ever since regarded Henri’s 
assassin as “the eternal glory of France”62 infuriated French politiques, caused considerable 
problems for the Society of Jesus, especially in the wake of the assassination of Henri IV of 
France in 1610, and excited modern historians of political thought tracing the origins of popular 
sovereignty and modern parliamentarian democracy. 63 Yet Mariana articulates ideas that were 
                                                          
58 Ibid., p. 95. 
59 Ibid. Also ibid., p. 114–116. 
60 Ibid., p. 65. 
61 Ibid, p. 392, p. 393. 
62 Ibid., p. 69. 
63 Mariana’s discussion of tyrannicide, De rege, especially book one, chapter six, p. 65-80. For a fuller 
discussion of Mariana’s ideas, their reception, and the relevant historiography, BRAUN, Juan de Mariana, p. 
80-91, p. 6-13; also Alexandra MERLE, “El De Rege de Juan de Mariana (1599) y la cuestion del tiranicidio: un 
discurso de ruptura?”, Criticón 120/121, 2014, p. 89-102.  
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not yet excluded from the mainstream of sixteenth–century theological–juridical debate, 
certainly not in his native Castile. His treatise De rege was never put on the Spanish Index. 
Much of what Mariana has to say on the subject echoes standard textbooks of theology 
and law. For instance, he agrees with most Catholic theologians that the usurper or “tyrant 
without a title” may be killed by any subject. He goes on to say that in extremis, if a prince 
violently abuses his subjects, if he does not listen to their pleas, if he consistently and 
continuously acts in a tyrannical way, the natural law of self–preservation could come into 
force. At this point, a respublica might decide to declare the prince hostis publicus (a principle 
from the ius civilis) and any private individual may kill the prince. Mariana discusses this 
process as a definite possibility – “each nation has its own way of judging matters”64 – not a 
doctrine popular sovereignty rooted in natural law. If we place these few lines in chapter six of 
book one of De rege in the context of the overall argument of the treatise, the discussion hardly 
amounts to a theory of popular sovereignty. 
Rather Mariana’s observations on why Jacques Clement came to kill his king are part 
of a narrative of Henri III’s moral and political decline. By the time of his death, Henri had lost 
the love, trust and support of almost all his subjects, Catholic and Calvinist alike. He is an 
example of a ruler who provoked his subjects to the point where they could no longer bear him. 
Henri III was one of those princes who follow Caligula’s maxim “oderint dum metuant”, but 
come to realise, sooner or later, that “force is not as easily applied to the mind as it is to the 
bodies of subjects”.65 His assassination is not a matter of whether suprema potestas ultimately 
rests in the people or the king, but  a matter of political prudence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Two years after the publication of De rege, Mariana reminded Philip III that he had been 
offered guidance such as needed to match the enormity of the task of governing the Spanish 
monarchy. In the preface to his Historia general de España, published in 1601, Mariana 
referred to De rege as “a book that comprised the virtues that befit a good king”.66 He went on 
to promise that his treatise offered the reader rather more than the usual fare. The book, its 
                                                          
64 MARIANA, De rege, p. 393. 
65 Ibid., p. 391, p. 65.  
66 Juan de MARIANA, Historia general de España, Compuesta primero in Latin, despues buelta en Castellano 
por Iuan de Mariana, Toledo: Pedro Rodríguez, 1601, preface, p. 3. 
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author claimed, provided Philipp III of Spain with a thought-provoking exploration of “the 
precepts, counsel and the rules” of monarchical government.  
Mariana also made clear that his investigation of the principles of good governance and 
the preservation of the monarquía Hispánica was based first and foremost in historical 
experience. De rege is the work of a humanist historian more than it is the work of a scholastic 
theologian.67 Mariana views theological and juridical conceptualisations of the theory and 
practice of government through the prism of history. He clearly stands apart from his more 
famous fellow Jesuits and members of the ‘Escuela de Salamanca’ such as Francisco Suárez 
(1548–1617) or Luis de Molina (1535–1600).68 He revised and in fact rejected foundational 
doctrines of Thomist–Aristotelian natural law theory in the light of Augustinian political 
ontology. The Jesuit constantly stresses the fundamental historicity, temporality and corruption 
of human political institutions. The Augustinian-Scotist angle of Mariana’s political ontology 
gives the adage historia magistra vitae a sharper edge. 
He is equally critical of the civilian tradition and of legal thinking and method generally. 
Mariana does not accept jurisprudence – whether rooted in scholastic natural law theory or 
Roman law - as a tool for understanding and framing the needs and the practice of monarchical 
government. He is hostile towards attempts – associated with the names of Jean Bodin or 
Alberico Gentili – to extract metahistorical and universal principles from diverse bodies of law 
and make those the pillars of political order.69 Yet he did not simply discard or disregard the 
civilian tradition either. Rather, he absorbed it into a new intellectual–analytical construct. 
Much of the first book of De rege is dedicated to the task of critiquing and recasting prominent 
tenets of Roman law as loci communes of political prudence. In many ways, the Jesuit is a 
Spanish counterpart to Justus Lipsius and Giovanni Botero.   
                                                          
67 On Mariana’s historical thought and method still George CIROT, Études sur l’historiographie espagnole – 
Mariana historien, Bordeaux: Feret & Fils, 1905; Richard KAGAN, Clio and the Crown. The Politics of History 
in Medieval and Early Modern Spain, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009; Francisco GÓMEZ 
MARTOS, La creación de una historia nacional. Juan de Mariana y el papel de la antigüedad en la edad 
moderna, Madrid: Dykinson, 2018.  
68 I cannot discuss Mariana’s relationship to the ‘School of Salamanca’ within the confines of this article. See the 
helpful definition of the ‘School’ as a ‘community of discourse’ in Merio SCATTOLA., “Zu einer europäischen 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Politik,” in Werkstatt Politische Kommunikation. Netzwerke, Orte und Sprachen des 
Politischen, ed. Christina ANTENHOFER, Lisa REGAZZONI, and Astrid VON SCHLACHTA, Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010, p. 23–54; also Thomas DUVE, “La Escuela de Salamanca: ¿un caso de 
producción global de conocimiento?”, Salamanca Working Papers Series 2 (2018), 1-32.  
69 On Bodin’s historical method, see, for instance, Marie-Dominique COUZINET, Histoire et méthode à la 
Renaissance: une lecture de la Methodus de Jean Bodin, Paris: Vrin, 1996; Julian FRANKLIN, Jean Bodin and 
the Sixteenth Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History, Westport CT: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1977. On Gentili, see the contributions in Benedict KINGSBURY and Benedict STRAUMANN (eds), 
The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations. Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
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The rejection of the Thomist–Aristotelian conceptualisation of the body politic and the 
dissection of the civilian constructions of political order converged in his trenchant and 
sustained critique of any notion of suprema potestas. In the view of Mariana, and this is a point 
he made throughout his treatise, notions and practices of “absolute royal authority” invariably 
prove counterproductive and damaging to the prince and the people. They will be most 
destructive where a monarch rules over many different territories with decidedly different 
political constitutions and traditions. De rege sets out an alternative model for the 
understanding and exercise of royal authority. The result of Juan de Mariana’s efforts was a 
language of political prudence or Catholic reason of state, which, though not free from tensions, 
inconsistencies and contradictions, offered a pragmatic and practical view of politics 
immediately relevant to governing the monarquía Hispánica. His De rege is a political manual 
for a Spanish monarch in the age of reason of state.  
 
